Geoengineering and geographers:Rewriting the Earth in what image? by Bellamy, Rob & Palmer, James
                          Bellamy, R., & Palmer, J. (2019). Geoengineering and geographers:
Rewriting the Earth in what image? Area, 51(3), 524–531.
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12495
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1111/area.12495
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Wiley at https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/area.12495 . Please refer to any applicable
terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the




Geoengineering and geographers: Rewriting the Earth in what image? 
Rob Bellamy a,b* and James Palmer a,c 
a Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 
6PN, United Kingdom 
b Department of Geography, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United 
Kingdom 
c School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, University Road, Bristol, BS8 1SS, United 
Kingdom 
* Corresponding author: rob.bellamy@insis.ox.ac.uk, +44 1865 288787 
 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Area, and was published on 9th September 2018 by 
Wiley.  




Large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system features centrally both in definitions of, and 
proposed responses to, the Anthropocene. In its deliberate guise—as climate geoengineering—such 
intervention is highly contentious, threatening to profoundly reshape the geography and politics of 
environmental governance frameworks, not to mention the nature of the environments towards which 
those frameworks are oriented. Yet, even as experiments with geoengineering technologies are 
growing in number, geographers continue to engage seldom with scientific, political or indeed public 
debates about them. In this paper we contend that geographical ideas about space, scale, power and 
geopolitics must urgently be brought to bear on ongoing efforts to experiment with geoengineering, 
and to deliberate its future role in responses to climate change. We develop this argument in two parts. 
First, we suggest that ongoing debates about the acceptability of geoengineering experimentation 
would benefit from recognising incumbent spatial and scalar categorisations (e.g. small-scale vs. 
large-scale, indoors vs. outdoors) not as fixed ontological anchors, but as relational and provisional 
constructs, open to being rethought in new, potentially productive ways. Second, we call for 
geographers to document and contest inequalities and injustices, both in debates about what 
geoengineering is or might become, and in the outcomes generated by efforts to undertake 
geoengineering in practice. Here there are opportunities for geographers to reshape the frames of 
reference used by others to comprehend the implications of the Anthropocene itself, drawing on 
traditional disciplinary strengths in ecofeminism, political ecology and environmental justice, as well 
as the production of space and critical geopolitics. Such endeavours, we contend, will form a vital 
complement to existing geographical engagements with the concept of the Anthropocene, reaffirming 
the value of the discipline’s distinctive—and explicitly normative—voice within ongoing policy and 
public deliberations. 
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Introduction: Geoengineering and Geographical Thought    
Experiments with geoengineering technologies—prospective large-scale interventions in the Earth’s 
climate system that seek to either remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere or reflect sunlight 
back into space—are growing in number. According to the IPCC, if the Paris Agreement’s ambition to 
limit global warming to no more than 1.5°C above preindustrial levels is to be met, the widespread 
deployment of some form of ‘geoengineering’ is highly likely to be necessary (van Vuuren et al., 2017). 
The very idea of this engineer-able Earth, or ‘geoengine’ (Yusoff, 2013), invites critical scrutiny of the 
ontological commitments underpinning geoengineering experiments and agendas. Yet human 
geographers continue to engage only seldom with scientific, political or indeed public debates about 
these technologies, tending to leave the way clear for other voices to shape their role in human responses 
to climate change, and in comprehending the implications of the Anthropocene more broadly. 
Several of those geoengineering experiments which have taken place have attracted a great degree of 
public interest and controversy (see, for example, Stilgoe, 2015), and—with more experiments 
planned—this is only likely to intensify. While some studies across nation states have shown that 
public perceptions of geoengineering can be similar (Wibeck et al., 2017; Carr & Yung, 2018), a 
growing body of research is illuminating the importance of situated knowledge (Hulme, 2008), 
contextual framings (Bellamy et al., 2012), deliberative spaces (Bellamy et al., 2017), particular 
places (Buck, 2018a) and local meanings (Gannon & Hulme, 2018), in shaping perceptions of the 
various technologies. Geographical context is also crucial, moreover, to the form and substance of 
emerging guidelines and incentives for responsible geoengineering research and development in 
different contexts (Bellamy, 2018; Buck, 2018b). 
As experiments with various geoengineering technologies continue, it is vital that closer attention be 
paid to the ways in which geoengineering, as a “material-discursive practice” (Yusoff, 2013: 2799), is 
serving to reshape space, scale, power, and indeed geopolitics. For example, a geographical approach 
to space—as fundamentally relational—would recognise from the outset the mutual constitution of 
imaginaries of geoengineering, and the heterogeneous spatial contexts within which they emerge and 
in turn serve to make themselves felt. And, following Clark (2013: 2828), we might expect new 
modes of geopolitics—‘geologic politics’—to emerge in the coming years and decades, as 
geoengineering begins to forge new kinds of relations between the “human aspects of place making” 
and “larger scale earth processes”.  
Rather than take any such relational view, however, would-be geoengineers and those who would 
seek to govern them routinely use spatial and scalar concepts in a strictly fixed, physical sense. 
Different ‘types’ of space or ‘levels’ of scale, for example, are understood to carry with them innate, 
pre-given levels of risk which lend themselves à priori to different ordinal classes of experiment. 
Ambitions to perform geoengineering ‘field’ experiments, for example, are often moderated by their 
being of a ‘small-scale’ (e.g. Parson & Keith, 2013; Dykema et al., 2014; Long et al., 2015), even as 
numerous ‘small-scale’, ‘limited’ experiments have ended in controversy (e.g. Schiermeier, 2009; 
Tollefson, 2012; Stilgoe, 2015). What is overlooked here is the inevitable contestability of “what is to 
be defined as small-scale and how the limits of the experiment are to be conceived if the experiment is 
in the world” (Yusoff, 2013: 2804, emphasis added). 
There is therefore a clear imperative to turn the gaze of relational geography onto the ways in which 
geoengineering experiments are spatially classified, and the ways geoengineering is imagined more 
broadly. In the first part of this paper, we draw on research examining public perceptions of 
geoengineering research in a range of contexts to contend that classifications of experimental space 
should always be apprehended as provisional and open-ended, rather than fixed and pre-given. While 
this perspective implies that the spatial imprint of geoengineering experimentation and indeed 
governance can always inscribed differently, however, it does not ask how the authority to kickstart or 
participate in this rewriting process might be acquired by different groups. The second section of the 
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paper therefore calls for the more intensive application by human geographers of core disciplinary 
concepts and tools—including those of ecofeminism, political ecology, and critical geopolitics—to an 
examination of power, inequality and injustice, both in participation in debates about what 
geoengineering is (or might yet become), and in the outcomes being generated by efforts to undertake 
geoengineering in practice.  
 
Relational, Open-Ended Spaces of Geoengineering Experimentation 
“We have inherited an imagination [of space] so deeply ingrained that it is often not 
actively thought…. It is an imagination with the implacable force of the patently 
obvious. That is the trouble.” (Massey, 2005: 17). 
The deeply ingrained spatial imagination to which Massey refers in For Space is one characterised by 
an often-unconscious commitment to mechanistic, Cartesian principles, grounded in ostensibly fixed 
and self-evident vertical and horizontal dimensions. Such understandings are clearly visible in the 
nested hierarchies of—and binary divisions between—the possible experimental spaces defined for 
geoengineering (see Table 1). The Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (2011), for 
example, proposes two categories of ‘indoors activities’: ‘1. Non-hazardous studies’ and ‘2. 
Contained laboratory studies or passive observations of nature’; and three categories of ‘outdoors 
activities’: ‘3. Small field trials’; ‘4. Medium and large-scale field trials’; and ‘5. Deployment 
activities’ (see Keith [2013] and Keith et al. [2014] for further examples). These spatial classifications 
are deemed to constitute an apolitical and objective means of adjudicating between experiments that 
carry more or less physical risk. Consequently, they are often used as proxies for delimiting forms of 
geoengineering experimentation that are more or less publicly acceptable. 
 
Table 1. Examples of conflated vertical and horizontal spatial binaries for the acceptability of 
geoengineering experiments 






Laboratory studies Field trials 
Indoors activities Outdoors activities 
  
 
Yet, as we know from geoengineering experiments that have already taken place, those that are 
ostensibly small-scale or ‘limited’ in some way can still end in controversy. The key reason for this, 
we argue, is that these spatial classifications are in fact much more fluid, emergent and contestable 
than they appear. A more relational approach would apprehend experimental spaces as the product of 
interrelations between multiplicities, or the “contemporaneous existence of a plurality of trajectories” 
(Massey, 2005: 12). Spaces of geoengineering experimentation, in short, will always be qualified and 
modulated through broader concerns about the politics, ethics and epistemological commitments of 
scientific work in this area. Such an approach “puts into question what might be the pertinent lines of 
differentiation in any particular situation” (ibid: 12). Indeed, recent research into public perceptions of 
geoengineering experiments and their governance has begun to open up the diverse potential of those 
‘lines of differentiation’. Bellamy et al. (2017), for instance, identify four such lines: the level of 
containment; uncertainty around what the outcomes would be; the reversibility of any impacts; and 
4 
 
the scientific ‘purity’ of the research. Drawing on this framework, we seek to explicate these 
multiplicities by illustrating some of the alternative spatial imaginaries that abound in public 
discourses on geoengineering experimentation. 
The first multiplicity, and that which is most reminiscent of the Cartesian imagination, is the degree to 
which geoengineering experiments are believed to be contained. In extant governance propositions, 
this often takes the form of whether or not an experiment is conducted indoors. Yet publics have 
productively engaged with the notion of containment in different ways, and with different 
implications for governance. One such differentiation concerns the idiom of ‘naturalness’, which has 
proven to be a powerful determinant of geoengineering acceptance, for instance among 
geographically varied citizens in the UK (Corner et al., 2013). Technologies that are perceived to be 
more ‘natural’ have been understood to be better “balanced” and “self-contained” than those that are 
not. Under this view, ‘natural’ experiments performed outdoors may be just as acceptable as those that 
are performed indoors. The encapsulation of an experiment—whether or not it would release foreign 
materials into the environment—is another perspective on more ‘modular’ containment. Those real-
world experiments that would release materials, such as for ocean iron fertilisation, have been seen as 
unacceptable, particularly among those whose territories are directly affected (Gannon & Hulme, 
2018). 
The second multiplicity is the degree to which geoengineering experiments are believed to be 
uncertain. Geoengineering has been characterised as an archetypal example of a governance issue 
demanding ‘post-normal’ science; that is to say, as well as being an issue of high stakes, it is one of 
great systems uncertainties (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). The straightforward scientific response has 
been that uncertainty is enabling: carrying out experiments will be the only way to reduce those 
uncertainties and provide decision makers with the information they need to govern. Yet, the 
‘extended peer community’ of publics that are necessitated in the scrutiny of post-normal science 
have conceptualised uncertainty in markedly different ways. The starkest departure from seeing 
uncertainty as an enabling device has been in the attention given to unintended impacts that could 
arise from geoengineering experiments. Here, uncertainty can be seen as a reason to constrain 
research, for example as has been found among Swedish citizens (Wibeck et al., 2015). Another sort 
of incertitude, ambiguity, may also exist at the level of the social framing of experiments, where 
contending criteria for ‘success’ may enable or constrain research ex ante or ex post (Bellamy et al., 
2016). Experiments have also been seen to have a constitutive relationship with uncertainty, whereby 
in order to observe the true effectiveness of geoengineering scientists would have to undertake global 
experiments tantamount to deployment. This view of uncertainty has been mobilised to call for an end 
to research into stratospheric aerosol injection altogether (Hulme, 2014). 
The third multiplicity is the degree the impacts of a geoengineering experiment are believed to be 
reversible. This, and the corresponding need to minimise such impacts, has been shown to be a very 
common concern among publics who have been engaged with geoengineering, including those in the 
UK and Japan (Pidgeon et al., 2013; Asayama et al., 2017). And yet, reversibility can be fruitfully 
differentiated in other ways. Under the view that experiments might contribute to “reversing the 
messing that we’ve already done”, publics have instead expressed an interest in the need to maximise 
impacts (Corner et al., 2013: 944). Focus on the perceived need to reverse the impacts of 
geoengineering technologies or their ability to reverse the impacts of climate change, however, fixates 
on the destination of experiments at the expense of the journey. German citizens have also expressed 
concerns about a ‘slippery slope’ from research to deployment (Merk et al., 2015). Under this view, 
governance might focus on slowing the pace of experimentation (Pidgeon et al., 2013). Publics may 
also possess different concerns about how experiments might change the political landscape within 
which geoengineering technologies reside: how would one ‘reverse’ the social and discursive impacts 
of an experiment that appeared to provide strong (or, conversely, weak) evidence of the ability of a 
geoengineering technology to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, for example? Once such 
5 
 
evidence is brought into being, debates about geoengineering cannot go back to their previous states, 
and this in turn will make some kinds of future developments or pathways—in both scientific and 
political settings—more (or less) likely. 
The fourth multiplicity is the degree to which a geoengineering experiment could be thought of as 
scientifically ‘pure’ and free from private interests. The Oxford Principles for governing 
geoengineering have declared that “the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of a 
geoengineering technique should not be prohibited, and may indeed be encouraged to ensure that 
deployment of a suitable technique can be effected in a timely and efficient manner” (Rayner et al., 
2013: 502). Yet, these specialist-defined principles might have evolved differently had the wider 
public been involved in their definition from the outset. Indeed, publics can exhibit quite different 
perspectives on private involvement, with some taking the view that the private sector should not be 
involved at all, for example in Japan (Asayama et al., 2017). Similar sentiments extend in other cases 
to the notion of maverick or ‘rogue’ scientists who might operate outside the bounds of accepted 
codes of ethics and practice. This was shown to be particularly the case with residents of the Haida 
Gwaii archipelago, who in 2012 were subject to 120 tonnes of iron sulphate being released into their 
waters as part of an ocean fertilisation experiment (Gannon & Hulme, 2018). 
The nuanced understandings of geoengineering experiments exhibited by publics expose how 
Cartesian approaches to space are underpinned by misleading binaries. The containment multiplicity, 
for instance, shows how place-based dualisms (contained–uncontained, laboratory studies–field trials 
and indoors–outdoors) are complicated by fluid, emergent and contested understandings: ‘contained’ 
means indoors to some, but equally, it meant natural or encapsulated to others. Similarly, the 
uncertainty multiplicity shows how the scale-based dualisms (small-scale–large-scale, microscale–
global and research–deployment) are complicated by relational understandings: a lack of knowledge 
could legitimately be used to justify both enabling and constraining experiments at the same scales 
and places while the constitution of uncertainty by certain experiments means that research and 
deployment would become one and the same. Thus, small-scale experiments that are relatively limited 
in extent, like the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project testbed and 
the Loha Fertilisation Experiment (LOHAFEX), for example, would not likely be acceptable if they 
raised, for instance, concerns about private interests and physical encapsulation (which, in point of 
fact, they did, respectively [see Stilgoe, 2015; Schiermeier, 2009]). The same applies to similarly 
spatially framed experiments, like the forthcoming Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment 
(SCoPEx) (see Dykema et al., 2014). 
 
New Geographies of Geoengineering: Inequality, The Production of Space, Geopolitics 
“[I]t is a world being made, through relations, and there lies the politics” (Massey, 
2005: 15) 
Geographical ideas have implications not only for rethinking the spatiality of geoengineering 
experimentation, but also for broader societal and policy-making debates about the role 
geoengineering technologies might play in future responses to anthropogenic climate change. Policy 
deliberations about geoengineering in the global North, at least to date, have tended to privilege 
knowledge with universalising or ‘globalising instincts’ (Hulme, 2010). Ongoing political discussions 
about the potential role of carbon dioxide removal in future European Union climate policy, for 
example, are heavily informed by global emissions trajectories and scenarios produced by the 
international community of climate scientists (Geden et al., 2018). And at the level of specific 
geoengineering technologies, assessments of technical and economic feasibility tend to isolate 
specific innovations from the messy, situated socio-economic and political contexts within which they 
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are developed and deliberated (see for example Keith et al.’s [2018] recent assessment of the 
feasibility of direct air capture).  
As Hulme (2010: 559) points out in respect of environmental problems more broadly, forms of 
knowledge which “assert themselves as the unassailable view from everywhere… lend support to 
managerial instincts that seek to centralise political power and social control.” It is no coincidence, 
therefore, that burgeoning aspirations towards the ‘planetary modification’ of what Yusoff (2013) 
provocatively terms the Earth’s ‘geoengine’ can be traced to restricted spaces of elite scientific and 
political deliberation, and that these spaces are largely devoid of public participation. Against these 
tendencies, geographical analyses can highlight the ways in which purportedly universal forms of 
knowledge undergo “constant reinterpretation… in different spatial contexts” (Hulme, 2008: 6)—or 
‘spaces of speech’ (Livingstone, 2007)—about geoengineering. And, no less importantly, geographers 
can also document how practices of knowledge production and representation, both scientific and 
vernacular, are always mutually intertwined with processes by which power and authority are 
allocated in efforts to govern a putative, ‘geoengineered’ future (Anderson, 2010).  
An obvious starting point in this regard concerns the nature of the voices and perspectives which get 
to be heard—or not—in debates about geoengineering. The heavy influence of technical, scientific 
assessments of geoengineering technologies, and particularly of climate modelling outputs in 
identifying probable emissions trajectories, has already been noted, but there are other axes of 
inclusion and exclusion towards which geographical scrutiny might productively be directed. Buck et 
al. (2013), for instance, have recently sought to open up discussions of the gendered dimensions of 
geoengineering, noting the restricted demographics of those currently pushing the geoengineering 
agenda, the prevalence of masculinist ideals in the design of specific technologies, the persistence of 
narratives legitimising man’s domination over nature, as well as potentially disproportionate social 
impacts for women and other marginalised groups. 
Some of these inequalities in participation (and indeed outcomes) might be countered by engaging 
directly with communities and groups not normally regarded as having relevant ideas or perspectives, 
thereby shedding light on ‘civic epistemologies’ of geoengineering (Jasanoff, 2007). Carr & Yung 
(2018), for example, have sought to explore public perceptions of geoengineering in a range of non-
Western contexts (including sub-Saharan Africa and the South Pacific), while others have engaged 
with citizens in diverse settings in the global North, including in Finnish Lapland (Buck, 2018a), 
Haida Gwaii (Gannon & Hulme, 2018), Japan (Asayama et al., 2017), New Zealand, Sweden and the 
US (Wibeck et al,, 2017). Geographers have much to contribute to these emerging strands of enquiry, 
drawing not just on the tools of ecofeminist critique, political ecology and environmental justice, but 
also on unique disciplinary approaches to the concept of place itself. Specifically, geographers can 
help to counter dominant views of place as a passive, static backdrop for experimentation with novel 
techno-scientific ‘solutions’ to a consensually-established climate ‘emergency’. Instead, they might 
promote an ‘interpretivist’ view in which competing imaginaries, discourses and narratives around 
geoengineering strive to establish compelling connections between the past and the future in 
inextricably local, situated contexts (Anderson, 2010; MacGillivray & Franklin, 2015). Through 
deploying participatory and co-productionist research methods in these settings, moreover, 
geographers can also help to contribute to the realisation of “self-determined planning for climate 
change” (Whyte, 2017: 154) in which developing countries take a leading role in discussions about 
the ethics and governance of geoengineering (Atiq Rahman et al., 2018, Winickoff et al., 2015). 
Beyond highlighting and counteracting structural inequalities and injustices, geographers are also 
well-placed to highlight the role of geoengineering in bringing into being new imaginaries and 
orderings of space itself. Geoengineering here is a fluid material-discursive object that is always in-
the-making in ways that vary across space, but that act of making goes beyond researching, 
developing and fine-tuning discrete technological innovations, to encompass the active reconstitution 
7 
 
of the spatial logics by which “efforts to regulate environments and to regulate human conduct” 
(Mahony & Endfield, 2018: 12) are ordered and intertwined. To take one possible example, deploying 
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) on a large scale could serve to bring into being 
an increasingly ‘horizontal’ energy system (Huber & McCarthy, 2017), underpinned less by inorganic 
fossil fuels than by the photosynthetic capacities of terrestrial plants and trees. Under these 
circumstances, geoengineering could become a neo-colonial tool promulgating existing global 
inequalities in wealth and standards of living, particularly if fertile land in the subtropics and tropics is 
enrolled within international supply chains to help perpetuate high-consumption, energy-intensive 
lifestyles in the global North. Countless other forms of spatial reordering promulgated by 
geoengineering are of course possible, but in all cases, geographers should be at the forefront of 
documenting and critically interrogating the inevitable connections which are being forged between 
those spatial articulations, and the historically uneven geographies of capitalism and colonialism 
which have persistently undergirded “humanity’s impact on the Earth system”, and as such the 
bringing into being of the Anthropocene itself (Barry & Maslin, 2016: 7). 
Finally, geoengineering’s ability to produce new forms and orderings of space will inevitably have 
significant implications for the shape—and substance—of global geopolitics in the Anthropocene 
(Dalby, 2015). As climate change threatens to have increasingly severe impacts in places 
disproportionately populated by citizens of less affluent states, for instance, the deployment of carbon 
dioxide removal or solar radiation management technologies could come to be framed as a moral 
obligation on the part of affluent governments in the global North, potentially rendering countries of 
the global South permanently dependent upon richer nations for ‘trickle down’ climate 
geoengineering benefits. For Clark (2013: 2831), such developments would usher into being a new 
kind of “geologic politics” underpinned not merely by efforts by national states to territorialise and 
govern the Earth’s surface, but by initiatives oriented towards harnessing and redirecting the “deep 
temporalities and elemental forcefulness” of the Earth, encompassing dynamic elements of its 
atmosphere and subterranean geology. The role of so-called ‘inhuman’ forces, and indeed the 
materiality of the Earth itself, in constituting this new “vertical geopolitics” (Elden, 2013), demands 
urgent engagement from political geographers interested in the relationships between geoengineering 
and the production of new social and political orders in the Anthropocene. 
 
Conclusion: Rewriting Geoengineering in Geography’s Image 
Deliberations about the acceptability of geoengineering experiments have to date largely been 
grounded in, and constrained by, overtly Cartesian determinations of space, place and scale. The first 
half of this paper has argued that dominant, binary modes of spatial and scalar categorisation should 
not be understood as fixed or pre-given ontological anchors, but rather as fluid, emergent and 
contestable imaginaries. It further suggests that geographical thinking is essential to exposing the 
intertwining of these imaginaries within situated local contexts, to highlight their open-ended nature, 
and thus to expose their innate potential to be reshaped and reconfigured in new, potentially 
productive ways. Taking the fluidity and mutability of geoengineering imaginaries as its starting 
point, the second section of the paper then proposed three inter-related areas of inquiry for human 
geographers interested in questions of power, inequality and potentially injustice surrounding both the 
development of these imaginaries, and their potential consequences in the future.  
Through an attention to the relational nature of spatial classifications we have illuminated how any 
effort to differentiate between different purported ‘types’ of experimental space will always be 
provisional and mutable. From this perspective, emerging legal instruments that pertain to 
geoengineering, such as the updated 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (which allows 
“small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting”) will in all 
likelihood continue to be met with contestation. Moreover, the classification of ‘geoengineering’ 
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itself, defined in many quarters as “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate 
system” (Royal Society, 2009: ix), will also remain contested. The existence of contrasting, and in 
some cases mutually contradictory spatial imaginaries in debates about geoengineering experiments 
reveals the intrinsic multiplicity of experimental space itself. This multiplicity, we argue, should not 
be seen as a source of epistemic dissonance to be closed down or disciplined into a fixed, pre-given 
roster of ways of experimenting. Instead, it should be recognised as a potentially generative force 
capable of yielding up new imaginaries of experimental space—and indeed new ethics of 
experimenting with the Earth’s climate system—to be continually explored and left open. The task for 
human geographers then, is to seek to explore and better document, in both academic and public fora, 
how prevailing spatial imaginaries around geoengineering technologies and their implications are 
constituted and contested, as well as the ways in which they serve to enable particular political, ethical 
and epistemological commitments while precluding others. 
Beyond calling for a relational view of experimental spaces, the paper has also suggested that 
geographical concepts and tools have a crucial role to play in interrogating questions of power, 
inequality and injustice around geoengineering. Specifically, we have argued that the discipline’s 
strengths in ecofeminist analysis, political ecology and environmental justice work positions it ideally 
to scrutinise emergent power dynamics governing the ability of different groups and voices to 
participate fully in debates about what geoengineering is (and what it might become). And, while 
studies of public perceptions of geoengineering in different contexts are multiplying, geographical 
strengths in participatory, co-productionist research could yet build upon such work to help 
marginalised and under-represented communities and groups realise genuinely self-determined 
planning for climate change (Whyte, 2017). In addition to questions about participation and authority 
in governance processes, there are also innately geographical questions to be explored in relation to 
the outcomes that geoengineering might have in practice. These include the potential for 
geoengineering to produce new orderings and imaginaries of space itself, with potentially profound 
consequences for the form and substance of environmental governance regimes, but also the potential 
for geoengineering to bring into being new modes and logics of geopolitics centred around ‘deep’ 
temporalities and ‘inhuman’ geological forces (Clark, 2013). 
Taken in the round, deeper geographical engagement with geoengineering could prove vital in helping 
to bring into focus elements of the so-called ‘Anthropo-not-seen’ (Lorimer, 2016), by beginning to 
shed light on diverse alternative imaginaries of forthcoming planetary dangers as they are being 
constructed in various contexts outside of elite scientific and political networks in the global North. 
And such endeavours, we contend, will form a vital complement to already-existing, diverse 
geographical engagements with the concept of the Anthropocene, reaffirming the value of the 
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